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Abstract 
 
This  paper  diagnoses  the  present  Russian  situation  characterized  as  the  “Russian 
Disease.” First, it shows that a key symptom of the Russian Disease is a strong positive 
relation between the country’s real growth and terms-of-trade-effects, which is different 
from the symptoms of the “Dutch Disease”. This paper also presents three variants (oil 
prices, terms-of-trade, and trading gains) of the concept of terms-of-trade effects using 
the SNA framework. Second, it shows a strong positive impact of terms-of-trade effects 
on the Russian manufacturing, which markedly differs from one of the major symptoms 
of the Dutch Disease (slower growth of manufacturing through the booming mining 
sector and real appreciation of exchange rates). This paper also suggests the significance 
of the manufacturing industry for the Russian economy. Third, this paper shows that the 
appreciation (depreciation) of real exchange rates of Russia’s rubles induced the boost 
(decline) of its imports. Fourth, this paper proves that the boost of imports, in turn, 
induced the GDP growth of the trade sector as one of the major sources of the Russian 
overall growth. We also present the impact of oil prices on two kinds of real exchange 
rates (CPI-based and GDP-based real exchange rates). 
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In  general,  the  relationship  between  the  oil  curse  and  economic  growth  in 
resource-rich  countries  is  elusive  in  the  long  run  (Alexeev  and  Conrad,  2009). 
Nevertheless, the Lehman shock, combined with the collapse of the oil price bubble, 
clearly showed that Russian economic growth heavily relies upon oil price changes. We 
here  characterize  the  present  Russian  situation  as  the  “Russian  Disease,”  the  major 
symptom of which is a strong positive relation between the country’s real growth and 2 
 
international oil price changes. 
In the literature, the Russian Disease has often been considered as a variant of the 
Dutch Disease. The term Dutch Disease in the original context refers to the contrast 
between external health and internal ailments (The Economist, No. 26, 1977). It also 
refers to the negative impact of expansion of natural resources in a country with oil 
price rises on its manufacturing growth through the subsequent appreciation of the real 
exchange rate of its national currency (see Ellman, 1981 and Corden, 1984). Although 
the real exchange rate of the Russian national currency (ruble) appreciated along with 
increases in oil prices, it is clear that the Russian Disease is quite different from the 
Dutch Disease in many respects. 
First, unlike the Dutch case in the 1970s, oil price rises for 1998-2008 resulted in 
relatively high overall growth in Russia. In addition, the impact of the marked fall in oil 
prices after the third quarter of 2008 on Russian growth was much greater than that in 
the Dutch case during the 1980s. 
Second, in contrast to the case of the Dutch Disease, the negative impact of oil 
price increases on manufacturing growth was not observed in Russia for the 1998-2008 
period. The manufacturing sector was one of the major sectors contributing to favorable 
growth in the 1998 (bottom)-2008 (peak) period, whereas its sectoral contribution to the 
great contraction of GDP in 2009 was the largest among sectors. Putin and Medvedev 
expected,  and  still  expect,  that  the  diversification  of  the  economy,  including 
developments of manufacturing, would contribute to establishing an economy that was 
not  dependent  on  oil.  Ironically,  it  is  now  obvious  that  the  diversification  itself  is 
oil-dependent. 
Third, the extraction of Russian oil and gas could not show any large expansion in 
physical terms during the favorable growth period. The oil and gas industry was the 
booming sector only in terms-of-trade. Putin seemed to expect the real expansion of oil 
and gas extraction through re-nationalization of the oil and gas industry. The Russian oil 
and  gas  industry  has  been  stagnant  in  real  terms  since  2005,  partly  due  to  this 
re-nationalization. Although the fixed capital increment in the oil and gas sector showed 
subsequent increases, the value of its sectoral total factor productivity (TFP) remained 
negative, and, thus, the oil and gas GDP growth was also very low for the 2004-2009 
period and negative for the 2006-2007 period (Rosstat HP as of September 8, 2010). 
The oil and gas sector will need tremendous capital replacement investments to raise its 
TFP. The marked oil price falls induced Russia’s great contraction of the GDP in 2009, 
while the oil and  gas  GDP did  not  show such a decline. This  stagnant  sector  only 
buffered  the  overall  growth  contraction  in  2009.  Ironically,  Russia,  with  more  than 3 
 
10-million-barrel daily production, was the world’s largest producer of crude oil in 2009 
thanks to a remarkable output adjustment (an 11 percent reduction) by Saudi Arabia (BP, 
2010).  Russia,  free  from  the  OPEC  output  adjustments,  has  always  escaped  the 
restraints of oil price increases, while it has been forced to face reductions in oil prices 
head-on. 
Fourth, the continuous appreciation of the real effective exchange rate of the ruble 
due to oil price rises induced the boost of imports in Russia, which, in turn, did not 
necessarily induce adverse effects on Russia’s economic growth and competitiveness. 
Russia experienced servicization, as in advanced countries as  well as  former Soviet 
republics. It has particularly Russian features deriving from its specific path dependency, 
which includes economic players’ strong preferences for imported goods and FOREX 
as well. The domestic distribution activities of imported goods are accounted for as a 
part of sources of the GDP. The boost of imports largely contributed to the high growth 
of the trade sector’s value added, which was, in turn, one of the major sources of the 
overall high growth. In the Russian official statistics, the revenues from foreign trade of 
oil and gas are included not in the mining sector but in the trade sector. However, these 
special foreign trade revenues could not be the source of the rapid GDP growth because 
Russia’s exports of oil and gas were also stagnant in real terms. Surprisingly, import 
substitution, including domestic assembling of foreign-make durable goods, appeared 
along with the boost of imports in Russia. The real appreciation of the exchange rate of 
the ruble boosted the imports of consumer goods and eased the imports of equipment 
and intermediate goods, which is considered to have contributed to improvements in the 
manufacturing TFP. Based on the unpublished Rosstat data on import matrix, the share 
of  imports  of  manufacturing  investment  goods  in  the  total  gross  demand  for  them 
amounted to 40 percent in 2006. 
In this paper, we examine statistically some of these facts to diagnose the Russian 
Disease and focus on the terms-of-trade effects on the overall growth as well as the 
manufacturing development. First, showing the key differences between the Dutch and 
Russian Diseases, we prove that a key symptom of the Russian Disease is a strong 
positive relation between the country’s real growth and terms-of-trade-effects. We also 
present three variants (oil prices, terms-of-trade, and trading gains) of the concept of 
terms-of-trade effects using the SNA framework. Second, it shows a strong positive 
impact of terms-of-trade effects on the Russian manufacturing, which markedly differs 
from one of the major symptoms of the Dutch Disease (slower growth of manufacturing 
through the booming mining sector and real appreciation of exchange rates). We also 
suggests the significance of the manufacturing industry for the Russian economy. Third, 4 
 
we show that the appreciation (depreciation) of real exchange rates of Russia’s rubles 
induced the boost (decline) of its imports. Fourth, we prove that the boost of imports, in 
turn, induced the GDP growth of the trade sector as one of the major sources of the 
Russian overall growth. We also present the impact of oil prices on two kinds of real 
exchange rates (CPI-based and GDP-based real exchange rates). 
 
2. Oil-Dependent Growth Path 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the key differences between the Dutch and Russian cases.1   
The  Netherlands  experienced  a  boom  in  natural  gas  extraction  in  the  1970s.  Its 
extraction level in 1980 (76.4 bcm) was 3 times the extraction level in 1970 (26.7 bcm), 
when the oil price in 1980 was 20 times higher than that in 1970. This gas extraction 
boom (the annual average change of 11.1  percent) led to a higher growth rate of the 
mining  value  added  (the  average  annual  growth  rate  of  8.2  percent).  The  Dutch 
manufacturing remained stagnant in the 1970s. Its annual average growth rate of the 
value added was 2.1 percent for 1970-1980.2  This was slightly lower than the average 
annual growth rate of the overall GDP of 2.8 percent. As a result, the GDP share of the 
mining sector at current prices showed a marked increase from 1.2  percent in 1970 to 
5.2 percent in 1980, whereas the GDP share of the manufacturing sector suffered from a 
marked decrease from 22.9  percent in 1970 to 16.6  percent in 1980. The presence of 
booming gas extraction and stagnant manufacturing production is obvious. As was 
stated, however, this booming sector with oil price rises did not produce higher growth 
of the overall GDP in the 1970s. Consistently, marked reductions of oil prices did not 
cause serious damage to the Dutch GDP in the 1980s. The elasticity of GDP growth to 
oil prices in this decade was 0.09, at the 1  percent significance level (without a trend 
term). A 10 percent increase in oil prices induced 0.9 percent of GDP growth. 
In contrast, it is obvious from the right -hand side of the chart in Figure 1 that oil 
price rises were  coupled with the relatively high overall GDP growth .  The  annual 
average GDP growth rate was 6.9 percent in Russia for 1998-2008. The Ural oil price in 
2008 was 8 times higher than that in 1998. The Russian manufacturing output also 
                                                   
1  The data for the Netherlands are from the United Nations HP and BP HP. The GDP data were also 
provided from Statistics Netherlands upon my request. The data for Russia are from Rosstat HP and 
Bank of Russia HP, and the quarterly oil price data are from Bloomberg.   
2  There are considerable differences between manufacturing growth rates in the United Nations 
database  (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/)  and  in  the  data  provided  by  Statistics 
Netherlands for the 1970-1986 period. Based on the UN data, the annual average growth rate of the 
manufacturing value added was 3.0 percent for the 1970-1980 period. Here, we employ the official 
data. 5 
 
showed a large expansion with an annual average change of 7.5 percent for the decade, 
based on the official data of industrial production. On the other hand, the oil and gas 
output  showed  slower  growth,  with  an  annual  average  change  of  4.3  percent  for 
1998-2008. Consistently, the marked fall of oil prices inflicted serious damage on the 
GDP as well as manufacturing output in 2009, whereas this did not happen in the oil 
and gas sector.   






































Oil and gas output Ural oil price (right axis)
1998=100 USD/bbl
 
Needless to say, the starting point of the Russian Disease was quite different from 
the Dutch case. The Netherlands already had advanced manufacturing with quite a high 
per capita GDP (55  percent  of the U.S. level in 1970), whereas Russia started its 
favorable growth of the GDP and manufacturing after it met the great contraction of 
GDP and the entire hollowing out of manufacturing due to the military conversion and 
the liberalization of imports. Russia’s per capita GDP was only 1835 USD at current 
prices in 1998 (less than 6 percent of the U.S. level). It overtook 10,000 USD in 2008, 
which was still less than one-third of the advanced levels, and fell below this level in 
2009. Nevertheless, the differences between the growth patterns of the Dutch Disease 
and the Russian Disease are noteworthy and help in the diagnosis of the current Russian 
economy. 
Figure  2  displays  Russia’s  GDP  as  well  as  the  Ural  oil  prices  for  the 
1995Q1-2010Q2 period. It also shows Russia’s GDI as the command basis GDP (the 
real  purchasing  power  of  the  Russian  gross  domestic  income)  and  trading  gains 
(command GDP minus real GDP) in real terms for 1995Q1-2010Q2. All quarterly data 
on GDP, command GDP, and trading gains are at chained rubles with the reference year 6 
 
2003 and seasonally adjusted by using the so-called census X-12. 
3 



















Trading gains Ural oil price (right axis)
USD/bbl 2003 chained bln rubles
 
Let us first discuss the relationship between the GDP and oil prices or trading gains. 
We denote the growth rate of a variable X as g(X) = dX/X and log(X) as its italic small 
letter x. For instance, the logarithm of GDP, log(GDP) is denoted by gdp.   
We  employ  the  equation  Y  =  Aexp(λt)P
α,  where  Y  =  the  real  GDP,  λ  =  the 
“surrogate productivity (SP)” (the exogenous effect), P= the oil price, α= the elasticity 
of GDP to oil price, and A = a constant. It follows from this equation that 
g(Y) = αg(P) + λ 
or 
gdp = (the GDP elasticity to oil price) * oil price + the exogenous effect*trend.   
The first term of the right-hand side of this equation shows the contribution of oil 
prices  to  GDP  growth.  The  second  term  presents  the  contribution  of  exogenous 
productivity effects on GDP growth. 
Following Rautava (2004, 2009) and based on the log-log type regression (OLS), 
for Russia (1995Q1-2010Q2), we can have the following GDP-oil price equation with 
all coefficients at the 1 percent significance level (adjusted R-squared of 0.968; and 
t-statistics in parentheses): 
                                                   
3  The data on GDP, exports and imports (not seasonally ad justed) at 2003 prices for 
1995Q1-2002Q4 are derived from the official growth rates and values in 2003. The data 
for 2003Q1-2010Q2 (not seasonally adjusted) at 2003 prices are from Rosstat.  All  
official data are from Rosstat HP as of October 1, 2010.  All seasonally adjusted data 
used in this paper are derived from non-adjusted official data through X-12. 7 
 
g(Y) = 0.177*g(P) + 0.67 percent (λ’s annualized rate of 2.7 percent); 
gdp = 0.177* oil price + 0.0067*trend.                                                                (1) 
      (9.439)                (10.339) 
These variables are not spuriously related but cointegrated (all results of unit root 
tests for the variables and regressions in this paper are shown in the Appendix). 
The GDP elasticity to oil prices, α, in the above equation shows that a 10 percent 
increase in oil prices induces a 1.8 percent increase in the Russian GDP. The value of 
the  variable  λ,  which  is  here  called  “surrogate  productivity  (SP),”  shows  that  the 
long-run trend growth rate annualized is 2.7 percent. The variable SP of λ corresponds 
to the TFP in growth accounting, which shows the effects of resource reallocations, 
modernization,  technical  progress,  and  catch-up  efforts  in  the  Russian  economy,  as 
Rautava (2004) suggested. It may also show the growth capacity in the absence of oil 
price changes.
4 
The average annual growth rates of the Russian GDP and the Ural oil price for 
1995Q1-2010Q2  were  3.7  percent  and  10.6  percent,  respectively.  The  oil  price 
contribution to the growth (0.177*10.6 = 1.9 percentage points) explains 51 percent of 
the overall growth rate. The residual 49 percent consists of the trend growth term SP of 
75 percent and statistical error of  -26 percent. About one half of the growth can be 
explained by the oil price impact, whereas much more than one half can be explained by 
the growth trend SP. 
Here, it is noteworthy that the picture of the Russian growth path differs using the 
samples from the bottom of 1998Q3 to the peak of 2008Q2. For this period we have the 
following regression result  with all coefficients at the 1  percent  significance level 
(adjusted R-squared of 0.997): 
gdp = 0.058*oil price + 0.0144*trend    (λ’s annualized rate of 5.9 percent).       (2) 
  (6.313)                (31.480) 
For  the  steadily  growing  period  the  underlying  growth  trend  or  the  surrogate 
productivity  is  rather  high.  The  annual  average  GDP  growth  rate  of  the  Russian 
economy for this period was 7.7 percent whereas the annual average change in Ural oil 
price  was  27.5  percent.  Therefore,  the  share  of  the  oil  price  contribution 
(0.06*27.5=1.65 percentage points) in the Russian growth amounts to only 21 percent. 
                                                   
4  Omitting the trend variable, we have the following result with the coefficient at the 1 percent 
significance level (adjusted R-squared of 0.913) and the ADF at the 1 percent significance level. 
gdp = 0.351*oil price. 
This regression without trend is also important for a comparative analysis because, in some oil-rich 
countries, the introduction of the trend variable may make the regression insignificant. This result 
implies that without considering any steady technical progress, a 10 percent increase in oil price 
induces a 3.5 percent increase in the Russian GDP. 8 
 
The residual 79 percent consists of the trend of 77 percent and the statistical error of 2 
percent. Indeed, high technical progress prevailed in Russia for this period. This result 
fits the production function estimates well when using the quarterly data, where TFP is 
estimated  as  the  annual  rate  of  4.9  percent.
5  In the favorable period, the oil price 
dependency of the Russian growth was much smaller than that in the whole period, 
including the 1998 and 2009 crises. As peculiar as this may sound, it suggests the key 
problem inherent in the Russian Disease. Continuous increases in oil prices could 
contribute to the higher growth, whereas a drastic drop in oil prices could destroy the 
favorable growth trend in Russia. 
Nevertheless, the GDP growth in oil-rich countries can be explained by oil price 
changes  in  a  well -defined  manner  because  international  oil  price  change s  have 
straightforwardly  reflected  the  trading  gains  or  losses  from  changes  in  the 
terms-of-trade  for 1995-2009. Their  imports and exports are large relative to GDP. 
Their commodity composition of imports and exports is very different. Their exports 
consist mainly of oil and/or gas, while their imports consist mainly of manufactured 
products.  The  present  world  competition  does  not  induce  the  price  rises  of 
non-resource-base  manufactured  goods  in  response  to  oil  price  increases.  In  this 
situation, the trading gains or losses of oil -rich countries from the changes in the 
terms-of-trade  can be large. They can use these trading   gains or oil windfalls for 
additional domestic final expenditures on domestically produced goods as well as 
imported goods. The movements of trading gains and command GDP (real GDP plus 
real trading gains) went along with oil price changes, as is shown by Figure 2. 
The GDP-oil price relation may be applicable to only major oil-exporting countries. 
If we employ the concepts of the terms-of-trade or trading gains (losses) in place of oil 
prices, we can have a more generalized relation in the framework of nat ional accounts 
that can be applicable to oil-exporting countries as well as oil-importing countries. 
According to the SNA 2008 (SNA 2008, section 15.187 ), the terms-of-trade are 
                                                   
5  Using  the  quarterly  data  (1999Q1-2008Q2),  we  estimated  the  Russian  production  function 
Y=Aexp(λt) K
αL
(1-α), where K and L: capital stock and employment; α: the capital distribution ratio; 
λ: TFP; A: a constant. Quarterly g(K) and g(L) are our estimations based on the official data. The 
result is as follows: 
coefficients S.E. t-Stat P-value Adj. R
2
α 0.524 0.137 3.833 0.001 0.995





ADF test statistic -4.124 0.003
Test critical values: 1% level -3.621      9 
 
defined as the ratio of the price of exports (P




are defined as P
e = En/ Er and P
m =Mn/ Mr respectively, where En, Mn = exports and 
imports at current prices, respectively and Er, Mr = exports and imports in real terms, 
respectively, in the conventional GDP calculations. 
Let us define the terms-of-trade effects (F) as the terms-of-trade (P
e/P
m) in place of 
oil prices. For 1995Q1-2010Q2 we have the following equation with all coefficients at 
the 1 percent significance level (adjusted R-squared of 0.976). 
g(Y) = 0.370*g(P
e/P
m) + 0.75 percent (annualized rate of 3.0 percent); 
gdp = 0.370* terms-of-trade + 0.0075*trend.                                                (3) 
(11.885)                    (15.773) 
This result implies that a 10 percent improvement in the terms-of-trade leads to a 
3.7 percent annual growth of the Russian GDP. The underlying annual growth (SP) is 
estimated about 3 percent. 
According to the SNA 2008 (SNA 2008, section 15.188), the real gross domestic 
income (real GDI) measures the purchasing power of a country’s total income generated 
by its domestic production. The BEA in the United States (BEA HP) calls this real GDI 
as  the  “command-basis  GDP”  because  due  to  improvements  in  the  terms-of-trade 
caused by the rise in export prices relative to import prices, the purchasing power or 
“command value” of the country’s GDP in international markets increases in relation to 
the real GDP (the value of the production of goods and services in the country’s prices). 
The trading gain (T) from the changes in the terms-of-trade can be defined as the 
nominal net exports deflated by the import price index minus the conventional real net 
exports.
6 
T= (En - Mn)/P
m - (Er - Mr). 
It follows from this equation that 
T=En/P
m - Er = Eｒ(P
e/P
m   - 1).                                                                                         
Therefore, T >=< 0 if P
e/P
m>=<1. If the terms-of-trade P
e/P
m improve (worsen), the 
trading gain should increase (decrease). At the base period P
e = P
m = 1 and hence T 
must be zero. 
The real GDI (Z) or the command GDP is defined as the real GDP (Y) plus the real 
trading gain. 
Z = Y + T. 
We focus on the relation between the trading gain T and real GDP (Y). That is to 
say, we do not focus on the GDI (Z) concept as an alternative welfare measure in place 
                                                   
6  Here we use the so-called Nicholson method, as in BEA’s national accounts. See Nicholson (1960), 
OECD (2006) and Kuboniwa (2007). 10 
 
of the GDP concept. Since the real GDI and trading gain are concepts that exist in real 
terms only, we measure the trading gain changes (trading gain) by changes in the real 
GDI-GDP ratios, g(Z/Y), which equals the difference of changes in the real GDI and   
real GDP, that is to say, g(Z/Y) = g(Z) - g(Y). 
Now we are in a position to define the terms-of-trade effect (F) in Eq.(1) as trading 
gain changes in place of oil prices or terms-of-trade. For Russia (1995Q1- 2010Q2) we 
can compute the real trading gain and real GDI (command GDP) at 2003 chained rubles 
when  the  official  data  on  exports  and  imports  at  current  prices  are  also  seasonally 
adjusted through X-12. 
Thus  we  have  the  following  regression  with  all  coefficients  at  the  1  percent 
significance level (adjusted R-squared of 0.976) 
g(Y) = 0.950*g(Z/Y) + 0.78 percent (annualized rate of 3.2 percent); 
gdp = 0.950*trading gain + 0.0078*trend.                                                     (4) 
  (11.599)                      (16.990) 
This result indicates that a 1 percent increase in the trading gain leads to an approximate 
1 percent increase in the Russian GDP. The steady trend growth in this regression is 
slightly higher than it is in Eqs. (1) and (3).   








oil price trading gain (GDI/GDP) terms-of-trade
normalized value
 
    Three variants of F, that is to say, P, P
e/P
m and Z/Y are closely related each other 
as is shown in Figure 3 which displays these variables as normalized data to have mean 
0  and  variance  1.  The  value  of  correlation  coefficient  between  series  {P
e/P
m  }  and 
{Z/Y} is 0.999 whereas the value between series {P} and {P
e/P
m } is 0.953. We have 
the following regression with the coefficient at the 1 percent significance level (adjusted 
R-squared of 0.931): 11 
 
g(Z/Y)= 0.156*g(P) ; trading gain = 0.156*oil price.                        (5) 
(28.650) 
This  equation  implies  that  a  10  percent  increase  (decrease)  in  Ural  oil  prices 
induces a 1.6 percent increase (decrease) in trading gains. 
Combining Eqs. (4) and (5) provides the following GDP-oil price relation which is 
indeed similar to Eq.(1): 
gdp = 0.148*oil price +0.0078. 
We also have the following regressions for elasticity with the coefficient at the 1 









m) ; trading gain = 0.367*terms-of-trade.                 (7) 
(73.403) 
From  these  equations  it  is  now  clear  that  an  increase  (decrease)  in  oil  prices 
induces an increase (decrease) in trading gains, which, in turn, leads to the GDP growth 
(decline). Since the oil price is indeed a good proxy of the terms-of-trade effect on the 
Russian economy, in estimating the Russian growth then and now there is no essential 
difference between three variants of regressions Eqs. (1), (3) and (4). This can be seen 
by Figure 4 which displays the fitted and actual GDP for these regressions. What we 
can state is only a broader range of applications of Eqs. (3) and (4) in comparison with 
the GDP-oil price equation (1). 








Actual fitted (oil price)




For  a  comparative  analysis  of  the  Russian  economy  let  us  first  consider  the 
Norwegian  economy  as  one  of  oil-dependent  countries.  All  variants  for  the 
terms-of-trade  effect  can  be  applied  to  Norway.  Using  Brent  oil  prices  (IFS),  for 
Norway (1995Q1-2010Q2) we cannot have any meaningful regression with trend. Thus 
we  have  following  regressions  without  trend  (all  coefficients  at  the  1  percent 
significance level):
7 
gdp = 0.149* oil price,                                                                                                (8) 
(13.862)    adjusted R-squared of 0.758. 
gdp = 0.423* terms-of-trade,                                           (9) 
(18.147)    adjusted R-squared of 0.843. 
gdp = 1.161*trading gain,                                             (10) 
(15.013)    adjusted R-squared of 0.786. 
trading gain= 0.124*oil price, 
(24.438)    adjusted R-squared of 0.907. 
trading gain = 0.348*terms-of-trade, 
(52.089)    adjusted R-squared of 0.978. 
In spite of the absence of the trend term the Norwegian value of elasticity of GDP 
with respect to oil prices is less than the Russian value. This is also reflected in the 
smaller value of elasticity of the trading gain to oil prices in Norway. 
The average annual growth rates of the Norwegian GDP and the Brent oil price for 
1995Q1-2010Q2  were  2.1  percent  and  10.8  percent  respectively.  The  oil  price 
contribution to the growth (0.149*10.8=1.6 percentage points) explains the 75 percent 
of the overall growth rate. Norway’s growth heavily relies upon oil prices, while this 
does not necessarily imply that it is more oil dependent than Russia’s due to the absence 
of the trend term and the slower growth in Norway. 
For Norway (1998Q3-2008Q2) with favorable increases in oil prices we can have 
the following results with trend (all coefficients except trading gain at the 1 percent 
significance level and the coefficient of trading gain at the5 percent significance). 
gdp = 0.030*oil price +  0.004*trend  (annualized rate of 1.8 percent)       (11) 
(2.919)                (8.446)          adjusted R-squared of 0.967. 
gdp = 0.132*trading gain + 0.0051*trend    (annualized rate of 2.1percent)     (12) 
(2.182)                        (14.079)    adjusted R-squared of 0.963. 
trading gain = 0.114* oil price. 
(18.133)    adjusted R-squared of 0.894. 
                                                   
7  The data for Norway are estimated by using the Statistics Norway HP data of non-seasonally 
adjusted series of GDP, exports and imports which are seasonally adjusted through X-12. 13 
 
The annual average GDP growth rate of the Norwegian economy for this period 
was about 2 percent whereas the annual average change in the Brent oil price was 24 
percent.  Therefore,  the  share  of  the  oil  price  contribution  (0.03*24=0.7  percentage 
point)  in  the  Norwegian  growth  accounts  for  35  percent.  The  residual  65  percent 
consists  of  the  trend  90  percent  and  the  statistical  error  -25  percent.  Although  the 
contribution shares of oil prices and exogenous effects in the overall GDP growth in 
Norway were higher than in Russia for this period, their values of contribution rates in 
Norway were much less than those in Russia. The impact of the terms-of-trade effect on 
the GDP growth in Russia is much stronger than it was in Norway. 
Let us next take a look at the U. S. economy as one of oil-importing countries.
8 
For the United States (1995Q1 -2008Q2) we have the following regression with all 
coefficients at the 1 percent significance level (adjusted R-squared of 0.986): 
gdp = 0.372*terms-of-trade + 0.008 (annualized rate of 3.2 percent).                    (13) 
(5.043)                          (28.812) 
We  also  have  the  following  regression  with  all  coefficients  at  the  1  percent 
significance level (adjusted R-squared of 0.986). 
gdp = 3.584*trading gain + 0.008*trend    (annualized rate of 3.2 percent)         (14) 
(5.271)                      (57.722) 
These  two  equations  are  linked  through  the  following  regression  with  the 
coefficient at the 1 percent significance level (adjusted R-squared of 0.994).   
trading gain =0.108 *terms-of-trade. 
(91.197) 
The U.S. value of elasticity of GDP with respect to trading gains is much higher 
than the Russian value. As is shown by Figure 5, this is partly due to the narrow range 
of the U.S. movement of trading gains. The annual average GDP growth rate of the U.S. 
economy for this period was 3.0 percent whereas the annual average change in trading 
gain was only -0.06 percent. Therefore, the contribution of trading gain to the U.S. 
growth accounts for only -0.2 percentage point (3.584*(-0.06) = -0.02). The residual 
contribution rate of 3.2 percentage points is the contribution of the exogenous effect. 
The elasticity of trading gains with respect to Brent oil prices for the United States 
is given by the following regression with the coefficient at the 1 percent significant 
level for 1995Q1-2010Q2 (adjusted R-squared of 0.562). 
                                                   
8  The data for the United States are estimated by using the BEA HP data of seasonally adjusted 
NIPA series of GDP, exports and imports. The United States as well as Japan met opportunities of 
increases of trading gains due to decreases in oil prices after 2008Q3, while the Lehman shock 
seems to have deprived these opportunities of further economic growth in the United States and 
Japan.   14 
 
trading gain = -0.041*oil price . 
  (-10.148) 
A negative relation between the U.S. trading gains and international oil prices can 
clearly be seen from this equation. 
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For  Japan  (1980Q1-2008Q2)  as  one  of  the  largest  oil-importers,  we  have  the 
following regression with all coefficients at the 1 percent significance level (adjusted 
R-squared of 0.941): 
gdp = 3.643* trading gain + 0.006*trend (annualized rate of 2.5 percent).       (15) 
(10.190)                      (42.365) 
The  Japanese  level  of  elasticity  of  GDP  with  respect  to  trading  gains  is  also 
sufficiently large. 
The elasticity of trading gains with respect to Brent oil prices for Japan is derived 
from the following regression with the coefficient at the 1 percent significant level for 
1980Q1-2010Q2 (adjusted R-squared of 0.903).
9 
trading gain = -0.028*oil price. 
(-33.616) 
As is expected, the negative level of elasticity of trading gains to oil prices in Japan 
                                                   
9  The data for Japan are estimated by using the ESRI HP (Japan’s Cabinet Office) data of seasonally 
adjusted series of GDP, exports and imports. Since Japan experienced subsequent declines of trading 
gains under the slow (positive) GDP growth for 1995-2008, it is necessary to extend the samples so 
that we can obtain an economically meaningful result for the relation between its GDP and trading 
gains.       15 
 
is much greater than it is in the United States. 
The  value  of  correlation  coefficient  between  the  Russian  trading  gain  series 
{GDI/GDP}Russia and the U.S. (Japanese) series {GDI/GDP}USA ({GDI/GDP}Japan ) for 
1995Q1-2010Q2  is  -0.803  (-0.935),  while  its  value  between  Russia  and  Norway  is 
0.895. The patterns of  changes  in  trading  gains  among oil-exporting countries  have 
strongly  positive  relations.  In  contrast,  those  between  the  major  oil-exporting  and 
oil-importing countries have more or less negative relations. However, it is noted that 
the patterns of changes in trading gains between the major oil-exporters and emerging 
countries such as China, India and Brazil may not be determined in a simple manner 
because these rapidly growing countries’ compositions of exports and imports are well 
diversified. 
    
3. Oil-Dependent Diversification 
 
As  was  shown  by  Figure  1,  for  the  favorable  period  1998-2008  Russia’s 
manufacturing showed  higher  growth  in  contrast  to  the Dutch manufacturing in  the 
1970s. 
Figure 6 shows the movements of the manufacturing GDP and the mining GDP for 
2003Q1-2010Q2  (here,  GDP  means  the  value  added  at  basic  prices).  All  data  are 
seasonally adjusted. This time span is very short due to the lack of data.   
Figure 6. Manufacturing and Mining: 2003Q1-2010Q2
F-statistic
Null Hypothesis: D(MANUSA) has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=7)
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
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    By omitting the trend, we have the following regression with the coefficient at the 16 
 
1 percent significance level (adjusted R-squared of 0.641): 
manufacturing gdp = 0.181*oil price.                                   (16) 
                 (7.271) 
Setting  a  trend  only  for  2003Q1-2008Q2  and  introducing  one  dummy  variable  for 
2009Q2-Q4, we have the following regression with the elasticity and trend coefficients 
at the 1 percent significance level (adjusted R-squared of 0.877 and coefficient of the 
dummy variable at the 5 percent significance level): 
manufacturing gdp = 0.151*oil price + 0.0053*trend                         (17) 
  (11.456)            (5.546)    
(λ’s annualized rate of 2.1percent). 
For 2003Q1-2010Q2, the overall GDP elasticity to oil prices and the growth trend 
are 0.159 and 2.4 percent (annualized), respectively. The elasticity and the growth trend 
of the manufacturing GDP are slightly lower than the overall values. 
Due to the lack of disaggregated quarterly GDP time series in the long run, we 
examine the elasticity of outputs of manufacturing subsectors to oil prices using annual 
industrial  production  data  for  1995-2009.  We  have  the  following  output-oil  price 
relation with the coefficient at the 1 percent significance level (adjusted R-squared of 
0.941): 
manufacturing output = 0.383*oil price. 
                      (14.361) 
For 1997-2007, we can introduce a significant trend variable into the regression and 
derive the following relation with all coefficients at the 1 percent significance level 
(adjusted R-squared of 0.993): 
manufacturing output = 0.206*oil price + 0.035*trend 
(6.601)                (6.911) 
The elasticity (growth trend) of the manufacturing output is slightly higher (lower) than 
that of the overall GDP. 
Table  1  summarizes  the  results  of  the  elasticity  of  all  major  manufacturing 
subsectors  with  respect  to  oil  prices.  As  is  evident  in  this  table,  all  values  of  the 
elasticity of the subsectors with respect to oil prices are positive. This suggests that the 
impacts of oil prices on all manufacturing subsectors were positive. The manufacturing 
subsectors showed steady growth during the favorable period and markedly declined 
with the large drop of oil prices in 2009. In particular, the rubber and plastics sector and 
the electrical and optical products sector showed high values of elasticity because these 
two subsectors showed high growth for 1995-2009. The electrical and optical product 
sector showed the highest values of the elasticity and the output growth for 1998-2008. 17 
 
This sector also showed the second largest decrease in outputs in 2009. The subsector 
that showed the largest decline in 2009 was the transport equipment sector, with the 
lowest value of elasticity. The average growth rate of this sector for 1998-2008 was 
relatively small because it suffered a large decline, a shocking 23 percent in 2001, for an 
unknown reason. When we take the period for 2001-2008 for the regression, the value 
of elasticity of this sector increases to a large extent. If we make a regression for the 
assembly of foreign-make cars in the Russian territory, which started in 2002, the value 
of the elasticity of this assembly to oil prices was extremely high (1.8). This assembly 
output showed large growth for 2003-2008 and a remarkable decline of 53 percent in 
2009. Oil prices accurately reflect these changes in output. 
Table 1. Elasticity of Manufacturing Growth to Oil Prices in Russia: 1995-2009
 
1995-2009 1998-2008 2009 adj. R
2
Manufacturing 2.9 7.4 -15.2 0.383 ** 0.936
 food products 4.1 6.7 -0.6 0.374 ** 0.886
 textile and apparel -0.1 4.8 -16.2 0.206 ** 0.496
 leather products 1.8 9.7 -0.1 0.408 ** 0.738
 wood products 0.4 6.3 -20.7 0.294 ** 0.809
 pulp and paper 4.0 8.1 -14.3 0.436 ** 0.769
     coke and refined oil 1.7 3.6 -0.6 0.181 ** 0.925
 chemicals  2.9 6.3 -6.9 0.321 ** 0.784
 rubber and plastics 8.6 15.1 -12.6 0.741 ** 0.933
 other non-metallic mineral -0.3 6.8 -27.5 0.303 ** 0.753
 metals 2.7 6.3 -14.7 0.341 ** 0.870
 machinery and equipment nec 0.9 8.9 -31.5 0.399 ** 0.833
 electrical and optical products 6.7 14.9 -32.2 0.879 ** 0.900
 transport equipment -1.3 3.5 -37.2 0.136 * 0.254
(2001-2008)  6.2 (2001-2008) 0.316 ** 0.931
     assembling of foreign make cars (2003-2009) 30.8(2003-2008) 60.2 -52.6 1.833 ** 0.930
   manufacturing nec 2.1 7.9 -20.7 0.401 ** 0.868
Sources: Author's calculations using data of Rosstat HP and Autostat.
**: significant at the 1 per cent level , *: significant at the 5 per cent level.
 Growth rates (percent) Elasticity
1995-2009
 
These estimates confirm that the impacts of oil prices on the overall manufacturing 
output as well as its subsector outputs were strongly positive. This is not a symptom of 
the Dutch Disease but a key characteristic of the Russian Disease. Needless to say, our 
regression analyses are insufficient due to the lack of data. Nevertheless, the Dutch 
Disease hypothesis (the slower growth of manufacturing in response to oil price rises or 
extraction increases) can be rejected for Russia. Our conclusion is quite different from 18 
 
suggestions in the preceding literature, including Oomes and Kalcheva (2007). Uses of 
quarterly or monthly industrial output data and controls over variables may not render 
our  conclusion  invalid.  However,  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  recent  data  of  annual 
disaggregated GDP for 2003-2009 (Rosstat HP as of September 8, 2010) may pose 
some challenges for our analysis based on the official industrial production data. The 
number  of  samples  is  too  small  to  derive  good  analytical  results.  We  provide  only 
preliminary observations. 
The new data include 36 subsectors of the manufacturing. Applying the data to our 
output-oil price equation, for 3 sectors, we have a clearly negative relation between 
sectoral GDP and oil prices at the 5 to 10 percent significance level. These sectors 
consist  of  (a)  textile  manufacturing  (excluding  apparel),  (b)  optical  equipment 
manufacturing,  photographic  and  film  equipment,  and  watches  and  clocks,  and  (c) 
aircraft  manufacturing  (including  space  transport  equipment).  The  overall 
manufacturing GDP and 16 subsectors show a significantly positive impact of oil prices 
on the overall output and their outputs for 2003-2009, while the correlation between oil 
price changes and output changes for the remaining 17 sectors is very weak for this 
period. 
The clearly negative results mostly arise from the statistical discrepancies between 
growth figures of the industrial output statistics and the national accounts statistics in 
Rosstat.  Table  2  illustrates  some  of  these  differences.  As  is  shown,  the  overall 
manufacturing  GDP  growth  is  less  than  its  output  growth  given  by  the  industrial 
statistics, although the correlation coefficient of these short time series has a rather good 
value of 0.956. The growth of the textile and apparel sector GDP is much less than its 
output growth from the industrial statistics. The value of the correlation coefficient of 
these two time series is only 0.483. This is largely due to the discrepancy between the 
growth rates in 2005 when oil prices jumped 47 percent. The growth rate of the textile 
and apparel output based on the industrial statistics was 3.6 percent in 2005, whereas 
the growth rate of its value added from the national accounts statistics was markedly 
negative (-11.8 percent). In general, the growth rate of the gross output of a sector can 
differ  from  its  value  added.  However,  the  Russian  discrepancy  for  the  textile  and 
apparel industry may be beyond the possible allowance range. Within the framework of 
the  Russian  national  accounts,  there  are  only  slight  differences  between  the  growth 
figures of sectoral gross output and value added (Rosstat, 2009), while, in some cases, 
including the mining sector and the crude oil and gas subsector, there are considerable 
differences  between  the  growth  figures  of  the  industrial  statistics  and  the  national 
accounts  statistics.  Since  the  present  Russian  industrial  production  statistics  are  not 19 
 
based  on  the  gross  output  shares  at  a  base  year  (the  Soviet  practice)  but  on  the 
value-added shares (the international standard), we can rely upon these statistics when 
considering output changes. We need further research on this problem. Nevertheless, the 
positive impact of oil prices on the overall value added of manufacturing cannot be 
rejected. 
(annual growth rates; percent)
A B A B
2003 8.8 10.3   1.2
2004 8.1 10.5 -7.2 -4.0
2005 4.4 7.6 -11.8 3.6
2006 6.6 8.4 9.7 11.8
2007 7.5 10.5 -1.9 -0.5
2008 -2.2 0.5 -5.4 -5.4
2009 -15.8 -15.2 -17.9 -16.2
Manufacturing Textile and apparel
A from GDP statistics
B from industrial statistics
Table 2. Discrepancies between Growth Rates of
GDP and Industrial Production
Sources: Rosstat HP as of September 8, 2010 and author's
calculations.
Notes: The GDP data for the textile and apparel are estimated
by the aggregation of the textile and the apparel using chain
method.  
We  can  also  suggest  the  importance  of  manufacturing  for  the  Russian  growth. 
Figure 7 shows sectoral contributions to the growth rate in 2007 and 2009 based on the 
official statistics (precisely, contributions of growth of the sectoral value added at basic 
prices to the overall growth rate of GDP at market prices). For instance, the sectoral 
contribution  for  2007  is  calculated  as  (the  nominal  sectoral  share  in  the  base  year 
2006)*(the sectoral real growth rate in 2007). 
The largest contributor to the 2007 growth rate of 8.5 percent was the trade sector 
(2 percentage points), followed by the real estate sector (1.8 percentage points) and the 
dummy sector of net taxes on product (1.3 percentage points). It is noteworthy that the 
real estate sector includes many business activities (rental of movables, computers, and 
related  activities,  R&D,  legal  and  economic  activities,  architectural  and  engineering 
activities, advertising, activities of employment agencies, and other business activities). 
Excluding the dummy sector, the manufacturing was the third largest contributor (1.2 
percentage points) of 15 sectors. The mining sector’s contribution was negative (-0.2 
percentage point). 20 
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If we replace the sectoral value added at basic prices (current prices) in the base 
year 2006 by the sectoral GDP at market prices, as in the practice of national accounts 
in Japan and the United States, the share of manufacturing GDP in the overall GDP in 
2006 will increase by more than 50 percent than the official share of the value added in 
the total GDP. This suggests that the contribution of the manufacturing GDP to the 2007 
GDP growth rate will also increase from 1.2 to 1.8 percentage points by 50 percent (we 
do not have to adjust the official growth rate in accordance with changes in the nominal 
shares). Furthermore, if foreign trade revenues generated from exports of the oil and gas 
are transferred from the trade sector to the mining sector (crude oil and gas) and the 
manufacturing sector (refined oil), this will reduce the share of the trade sector value 
added in the total GDP by 25 percent. As a result, the contribution of the trade sector to 
the 2007 GDP growth rate should be reduced from 2 to 1.5 percentage points by 25 
percent.  After  all,  if  Japanese  and  U.S.  methodologies  are  used,  the  manufacturing 
sector would be the largest contributor to the 2007 growth rate.   
Based on the official data, the largest contributor to the 2009 GDP contraction of 
7.9  percent  was  the  manufacturing  sector  (2.4  percentage  points),  followed  by  the 
dummy sector of net taxes on product (1.9 percentage points) and the trade sector (1.8 
percentage points). The mining sector’s contribution to the contraction was only 0.1 
percentage point. After similar adjustments made for 2007, the contraction contribution 
of  the  manufacturing  sector  will  increase  from  2.4  to  3.5  percentage  points. 
Approximately half of the 2009 recession can be explained by the manufacturing slump. 
Thus, it is clear that the impact of the manufacturing sector on the Russian overall 21 
 
growth is markedly large.   
Table 3.  A Comparison of Industrial Structure: Oil-rich Counties and Japan























А Agriculture 4.1 4.2 0.7 5.5 5.6 1.2
В Fishing 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.2
С Mining  9.4 18.8 23.2 48.3 54.7 15.1 0.1
Crude oil and gas 7.8 17.3 23.0 48.3 54.7 … …
Other mining  1.6 1.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 … …
D Manufacturing 15.8 24.4 8.7 9.4 5.1 11.5 18.3
Automobile 0.5 1.1 0.1 - - 0.1 1.7
Refined oil 2.9 6.3 1.0 3.3 … 1.1 0.9
Other manufacturing 15.4 17.0 7.6 6.1 … 10.4 15.7
Е Electricity, gas and water supply 2.8 3.0 2.3 0.9 0.8 1.7 2.6
F Construction 4.6 4.7 3.9 4.6 7.1 9.4 5.8
G Trade 17.6 13.1 7.2 4.9 12.4 14.4
Н Hotels and restaurants 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.6 0.9 2.5
I Transport and communication 8.5 8.5 6.9 3.2 5.7 11.5 10.2
J Financial intermediation 3.9 3.9 3.5 1.1 5.9 5.2
K Real estate 8.6 8.7 12.4 1.6 14.8 11.2
L Public administration 4.4 4.4 3.9 2.1 1.9 6.2
M Education 2.3 2.3 3.9 1.8 3.3 5.4
N Health and social work 2.9 2.9 7.7 1.2 1.7 6.0
O Other services 1.6 1.7 2.8 2.4 1.2 1.8 10.8
FISIM -2.2 -2.2 　 -1.4 -0.7 -4.8 -
Net taxes on products  14.6 - 11.0 0.9 7.0 7.2 -
GDP at market prices 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: http://www.gks.ru, http://www.ssb.no,http://www.cdsi.gov.sa, http://www.stat.go.jp. 
Data supplied by Rosstat, CIS Statistics Committee and Kazakh Statistics Office, and author's estimation.






Table 3 presents the industrial structure of Russia in comparison with four oil-rich 
countries and Japan. The Russian original data is converted to an estimation in which 
the net taxes on products are distributed among sectors and foreign trade and transport 
revenues  from  oil  and  gas  sectors  are  transferred  to  the  mining  sector  and  the 
manufacturing  sector  (see  Kuboniwa,  Tabata,  and  Ustinova,  2003).  The  above 
adjustments of sectoral value added for the contribution calculations were derived from 
the information presented in this table. From this table, we can derive the following 
findings. 
First,  the  estimated  GDP  share  of  the  Russian  mining  sector  of  19  percent  is 
sufficiently large, whereas it is much less than the GDP share of Norway (23 percent), 
Saudi  Arabia  (48  percent),  and  Azerbaijan  (55  percent).  From  the  viewpoint  of 
industrial structure, the oil dependency in Russia is much less than that in Norway, with 
a  highly  developed  GDP  per  capita  level,  and  that  of  Saudi  Arabia,  which  has  the 22 
 
world’s largest oil reserves. 
Second,  the  estimated  GDP  share  of  the  Russian  manufacturing  sector  of  24 
percent is much higher than the manufacturing GDP share in Norway (9 percent), Saudi 
Arabia (9 percent), Azerbaijan (5 percent), and Kazakhstan (12 percent), even though 
one-fourth of the Russian manufacturing GDP is generated by the oil refinery subsector. 
Surprisingly, this manufacturing share in Russia is much larger than the corresponding 
GDP  share  of  18  percent  in  Japan,  with  highly  developed  manufacturing  partially 
because Japan experienced a hollowing out of manufacturing through capital out-flow. 
As was stated, Russia also experienced the hollowing out of manufacturing in quite a 
different context. 
The manufacturing sector is still important for the economy of Russia, which has a 
population of 140 million. The position of manufacturing in Russia is entirely different 
from that in Norway, which has a population of 5 million. Based on the BP data, the 
Norwegian export level of crude oil relative to the Russian level was indeed 76 percent 
in 2000 even if it continuously declined to 37 percent in 2005 and 27 percent in 2009 
due to marked declines of oil extraction in Norway. The Norwegian export level of 
natural gas relative to the Russian level accounted for 26 percent in 2000 and increased 
continuously from 45 percent in 2005 to 72 percent in 2009. Indeed, Norway is an 
oil-dependent country. As Norway did not have to develop manufacturing, its sensitivity 
to overall output as well as manufacturing to oil prices is low. Roughly, if the Russian 
export  level  of  crude  oil  and  gas  were  ten  times  the  Norwegian  level  without  any 
deterioration of international oil prices, Russian people would enjoy at least a per capita 
GDP  of  50,000  USD  and  would  not  have  to  worry  about  further  development  in 
manufacturing. However, if this dream did not come true at all and Russia wanted to 
catch up on the U.S. per capita GDP level with a high employment rate, Russia should 
derive further growth of manufacturing. 
 
4. Rapid Increases in Imports and High Growth of the Trade Sector 
 
The  boost  of  imports  was  associated  with  the  Russian  favorable  growth. 
Consistently, the great contraction of the GDP growth in 2009 was coupled with the 
drastic drop in imports. Since the GDP concept is a net of imports, increases in imports 
have  a  directly  negative  impact  on  GDP  growth.  However,  the  Russian  economic 
growth went along increases in imports. As was reported, the continuous appreciation of 
the real effective exchange rate (REER) of the ruble due to oil price rises induced the 
boost of imports in Russia, which, in turn, did not necessarily induce adverse effects on 23 
 
Russia’s economic growth and competitiveness. 
Figure 8 presents the movements of imports and REER with the GDP growth in 
Russia for 1995Q1-2010Q2. In this figure, two kinds of REER are shown. One is the 
IFS’s CPI-based real effective exchange rate (REER_IFS). Another is the GDP-based 
real effective exchange rate (REER_GDP), which is derived using the Russian GDP 
deflator and the U.S. GDP deflator.
10 
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First, we can derive the following regression result for imports, GDP, and REER, 
with all coefficients at the 1 percent significance level: 
imports = 1.700*gdp + 0.729*reer_ifs      (adjusted R-squared of 0.984);        (18) 
(31.023)        (12.857) 
and 
imports = 1.655*gdp + 0.437*reer_gdp    (adjusted R-squared of 0.987).            (19) 
(33.146)        (15.030) 
It  is  noteworthy  that,  unlike  in  Rautava  (2009),  the  above  regressions  do  not 
include the variable of oil price changes because, in the introduction of this additional 
variable, its coefficient was not statistically significant. These equations for two real 
                                                   
10  The U.S. quarterly deflator is from the NIPA on BEA HP. The Russian deflator is an estimation in 
which the official GDP series in nominal terms are seasonally adjusted by X-12, and our GDP series 
with corrections of the official non-seasonally adjusted data for 1995-2003 at 2003 prices are also 
seasonally  adjusted  by  X-12.  The  nominal  exchange  rate  is  from  IFS.  The  effectiveness  of  the 
GDP-based REER in the empirical analysis of oil-rich countries is suggested by  Korhonen and 
Juurikkala (2009).     24 
 
exchange rates, regarding the elasticity of imports to GDP, are almost similar. They 
suggest that a 1 percent of GDP growth induces a 1.7 percent increase in imports. A 10 
percent appreciation of the CPI-based (GDP-based) real exchange rate leads to about a 7 
(4) percent increase in imports. The elasticity of imports to CPI-based real exchange 
rate is about twice higher than that to GDP-based real exchange rate.  As is shown, 
imports grew (fell down) with the GDP growth (contraction) in Russia. In addition, the 
subsequent appreciation of the real exchange rate of the ruble would bring about the 
boost of imports in Russia. The effects of oil prices on imports are indirectly shown by 
the GDP variable, which heavily depends on the oil prices, as explained. 
The  Russian  level  of  elasticity  of  real  exchange  rates  to  oil  prices  is  rather 
debatable. From the given data, we have the following results at all coefficients at the 1 
percent significance level: 
reer_ifs = 0.256*oil price    (adjusted R-squared of 0.514);                  (20) 
          (8.090) 
reer_gdp = 0.486*oil price    (adjusted R-squared of 0.586);                 (21) 
(9.345) 
and 
reer_ifs = 0.541* reer_gdp    (adjusted R-squared of 0.925).                 (22) 
        (27.196) 
The value of the GDP-based  elasticity  of 0.49 is  about  twice the value of the 
CPI-based elasticity. This is due to the fact that the movement of the CPI is more stable 
than that of the GDP deflator in Russia. Our result for the GDP-based elasticity (0.5) is 
consistent with the results for the OPEC countries shown in Korhonen and Juurikkala 
(2009), while our result for the CPI-based elasticity is lower than expected.
11  However, 
even for 2000Q1-2008Q2, the elasticity of the CPI -based real exchange rate with  
respect to oil prices shows the value of 0.326 (adjusted R -squared  of 0.775; the 
coefficient at the 1  percent significance level). Although this problem requires further 
examination,  our  results  of  the  elasticity  of  both  CPI -based  and  GDP -based  real 
exchange rates with respect to oil prices may be plausible. 
As was reported, according to the official statistics, the trade sector was the largest 
contributor to the favorable economic growth and the second largest contributor to the 
2009 recession. The domestic distribution activities of imported goods are accounted as 
a part of sources of GDP. We would like to prove that the boost of imports largely 
contributed to the high growth of the trade sector GDP, which was, in turn, one of the 
                                                   
11  Oomes  and  Kalcheva  (2007)  presented  the  results  of  the  elasticity  (0.49  to  0.58)  with  many 
additional operations.   25 
 
major sources of the overall high growth. 
Figure 9 shows the trade sector GDP (the value added at basic prices) and imports 
at 2003 chained rubles.
12  Let us consider the equation Ytrade = Aexp(λt)M
α, where Ytrade 
= the real trade sector GDP, M = real overall imports, α = the elasticity of the trade 
sector GDP with respect to imports, λ = the exogenous effects, and A = a constant. Then, 
g(Ytrade) = α*g(M) + λ; 
trade gdp = elasticity*imports + exogenous effects*trend. 
Using the log-log type regression, we have the following result with all coefficients 
at the 1 percent significance level (adjusted R-squared of 0.989): 
trade gdp = 0.374*imports + 0.0063  (annualized rate of 2.5percent).                  (23) 
(21.905)              (12.624) 
This result indicates that a 1 percent increase in imports induces an approximate 
0.4 percent growth of the trade sector GDP. The underlying growth trend of 2.5 percent 
reflects  the  distribution  activities  (trade  margins  from  the  final  expenditures)  of 
domestically  produced  goods  and  services,  including  most  of  life’s  necessities  and 
exports. 
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The  average  annual  growth  rate  of  the  trade  sector  GDP  and  imports  for 
1995Q1-2010Q2 were 5.1 percent and 8.5 percent, respectively. The contribution of 
                                                   
12  We connected the trade GDP data based on the old classification for 1995Q1-2002Q4 (available 
at the archive on Rosstat HP) with the data based on the new classification for 2003-2009 using the 
official growth rates for 1996Q1-2003Q4. The time series are seasonally adjusted by using X-12. 
There is very little difference between the coverage of the two classifications for the trade sector.           26 
 
imports to this growth amounts to 3.2 percentage points (0.374*8.5=3.2). Hence, the 
contribution share of imports in the trade sector GDP accounts for more than 62 percent 
for  the  observed  62  quarters.  The  residual  of  38  percent  consists  of  the  underlying 
growth trend of 49 percent and the statistical error of -11 percent. 
Indeed, the impact of imports on the trade sector GDP is sufficiently large. The 
factors  determining  the  rapid  growth  of  the  trade  sector  have  not  yet  been  studied. 
Needless to say, there are still many problems to solve, including the growth rate of the 
non-observed economy of the trade sector, which comprises about 38 percent of the 
trade sector value added at current prices in 2007 (Rosstat HP). The official data on the 
trade sector GDP also includes foreign trade revenues from oil and gas. This is very 
important in nominal terms. However, it cannot be the source of the rapid growth of the 
trade sector because exports of oil and gas have not shown marked increases in physical 
terms. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Using  simple  regressions  and  descriptive  statistics,  we  showed  the  difference 
between the Dutch and Russian Diseases. We demonstrated that the key symptom of the 
Russian Disease is the strong positive impact of oil prices or trading gains on the overall 
GDP  growth  and  the  manufacturing  growth  as  well.  In  a  sense,  this  suggests  high 
potentials for the Russian economy because continuous increases in oil prices induce 
higher GDP growth with higher TFP in Russia than in most of the other resource-rich 
and  non-resource-rich  countries.  However,  the  fact  that  the  diversification  efforts 
themselves  are  oil-dependent  would  bring  about  rather  high  instability  with  vast 
volatilities in the economy. The reconstruction of the Russian industrial base, including 
developments of SMEs, would require several decades. 
We also reformulated the oil price windfalls (disasters) as the trading gains (losses) 
in the framework of national accounts. The findings of the studies on the spillover effect 
mechanisms of trading gains (losses) over all the sectors of the economy are yet to be 
thoroughly analyzed. 
In addition, we clarified an important aspect of the functions of imports in Russian 
economic growth through the value added of the trade sector generated by the domestic 
distribution of imports. The fact that the growth leader is the traditional trade sector can 
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The order of integration of the series is important for the selected regressions. We 
tested for unit roots by the commonly used Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. Table 
A  below  shows  results  using  the  lag  length  selected  by  the  Schwarz  information 
criterion. For all series of variables in levels we cannot reject the null of nonstationarity. 
In  other  words,  all  variables  are  nonstationary.  Performing  the  tests  for  the  first 
differences of variables, we reject the null of nonstationarity. Since all variables have to 
be differenced once to obtain stationarity, they are integrated of order 1, I (1). 
To test whether the nonstationary variables in our regressions are cointegrated or 
spuriously related, we examined the properties of the regression residuals by the ADF 
test. Table B below reports our results for regressions in this paper. For all regressions 
we can reject the null of no cointegration. In other words, the nonstationary variables in 
all of our regressions are cointegrated. 29 
 
Table A. Results of ADF Tests for Variables
Variables Exogenous Lag t-Stat.
Russia for 1995Q1-2010Q2 except manufacturing gdp
gdp constant, trend 1 -2.925
D(gdp) constant 0 -4.348 **
oil price constant, trend 1 -3.444
D(oil price) constant 0 -4.348 **
trading gain constant, trend 1 -3.315
D(trading gain) constant 0 -5.292 **
trade gdp constant, trend 1 -2.227
D(trade gdp) constant 0 -3.993 **
imports constant, trend 1 -2.769
D(imports) none 0 -4.454 **
reer_ifs constant, trend 1 -2.223
D(reer_ifs) constant 0 -5.519 **
reer_gdp constant, trend 1 -2.098
D(reer_gdp) constant 0 -4.776 **
manufacturing gdp constant, trend 1 -2.209
D(manufacturing gdp) constant 0 -3.522 *
terms-of-trade constant 1 -1.581
D(terms-of-trade) none 0 -5.081 **
Norway for 1995Q1-2010Q2
oil price  (Brent) constant 1 -1.125
D(oil price) none 1 -5.996 **
gdp constant, trend 1 -2.321
D(gdp) constant 0 -13.827 **
trading gain constant, trend 3 -3.881
D(trading gain) constant 0 -5.306 **
terms-of-trade constant, trend 2 -3.744
D(terms-of-trade) constant 0 -6.368 **
The United States for 1995Q1-2010Q2
gdp constant, trend 1 -1.000
D(gdp) constant 0 -4.460 **
trading gain constant, trend 3 -4.064
D(trading gain) constant 0 -6.726 **
terms-of-trade constant, trend 1 -3.500
D(terms-of-trade) constant 3 -5.355 **
Japan for 1980Q1-2010Q2
gdp constant, trend 0 -0.907
D(gdp) constant 0 -8.963 **
trading gain constant, trend 2 -1.109
D(trading gain) constant 1 -8.076 **
Notes:
**: the 1 percent significance level.
*: the 5 percent significance level
The lag length is generated by the Schwarz information criterion.
D(x) denotes the first difference of x.  30 
 
Equation Lag t-Stat.
Eq. (1) 0 -2.982 **
Eq. (2) 0 -3.258 **
Eq. (3) 0 -3.322 **
Eq. (4) 0 -3.551 **
Eq. (5) 0 -3.829 **
Eq. (6) 0 -4.200 **
Eq. (7) 1 -2.980 **
Eq. (8) 0 -3.182 **
Eq. (9) 0 -3.455 **
Eq. (10) 0 -2.909 **
Eq. (11) 1 -5.092 **
Eq. (12) 0 -7.812 **
Eq. (13) 2 -3.023 **
Eq. (14) 2 -3.093 **
Eq. (15) 1 -1.978 *
Eq. (16) 0 -2.109 *
Eq. (17) 1 -4.062 **
Eq. (18) 0 -3.562 **
Eq. (19) 0 -3.694 **
Eq. (20) 0 -3.042 **
Eq. (21) 1 -2.163 *
Eq. (22) 0 -3.349 **
Eq. (23) 0 -4.180 **
Notes:
**: the 1 percent significance level. 
*: the 5 percent significance level.
D(x) denotes the first difference of x.
The lag length is generated by the Schwarz
information criterion.
Table B. Results of ADF Tests for
Residuals of Regressions
 